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Socrates' Moral Conviction and its Basis in Plato's Apology of Socrates

MASATOSHI KAMADA

In Plato's Apology, Socrates claims that he knows nothing good on the one hand and indicates almost absolute confidence concerning the righteousness of his philosophical activities on the other. I think the latter appears in this claim of knowledge of his.

"I know it is evil and disgraceful to do injustice and to disobey my superior, god or man."(29b)

What is the relationship between this claim of knowledge and his consciousness of knowing nothing good and how does this claim of knowledge make him confident ?

G.VIastos thinks Socrates had a special kind of knowledge and so a certain extent of virtue and therefore thought his life was happy. Viastos regarded Socrates' knowledge in the weaker sense as elenctically justifiable beliefs and considered Socrates' conviction dependant on such knowledge. According to Vlastos, such knowledge always has 'a security-gap,' i.e. the possibility of being false. However, we do not want to decrease this 'gap' at the expense of our daily utilities and try to live with this fallible knowledge. The trial described in the Apology is not a daily event but a situation unavoidable for Socrates' life and death. For this reason, I can not think that the basis for deciding whether our way of life is just or not is on the same level as a simple decision in daily life. Therefore, even if the knowledge in 29b is fallible knowledge in Vlastos' sense, I think it can not explain Socrates' moral conviction about the righteousness of his philosophical activities.

In the Apology, one aspect of the knowledge Socrates ascribes to himself is the so-called 'consciousness of ignorance.' Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness to his knowledge. On his first interpretation of the oracle of Delphi, the god of Delphi allows only Socrates' consciousness of ignorance as a kind of knowledge. The knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b includes moral judgements. Therefore, Socrates' basis for this knowledge has been thoroughly discussed in relation to his claim of consciousness of ignorance. One way to resolve this problem is to take it into account that Socrates apologizes during his trial. In a trial, it is necessary not only to clearly tell his audience what he knows, but also to clarify the basis of his knowledge. But does he need to show the basis of the knowledge-claims in 29b and 37b ? What he said there is, if we take his words at their face value, self-evident to his audience, but recognizing what is implied, we (and also his audience)can not accept Socrates' words easily. Namely, he says he chooses the death penalty rather than the banishment from his country. This is what anyone in his audience would expect, but could not be persuaded easily. For without any other condition, anyone of us would wish to avoid the death penalty. But Socrates had an inviolable condition. So in the Apology 29b,he does not simply claim the truth of his beliefs but also emphasizes that there is a firm basis for the knowledge-claim and that he had a resolute will to behave according to his beliefs. I think the very basis which he was ready to bring forward as his witness is at the core of his moral conviction.

Socrates brings forward the god of Delphi as a witness for the knowledgeclaim in 29b and 37b. However, as previously said, the oracle of Delphi does not issue substantive statements or commands. In short, he 'interprets' the oracle as a command of the god and on this interpretation relates his consciousness of his ignorance to the knowledge claimed in 29b and 37b. I think this interpretation makes his conviction firmer. For the basis of his knowledge is what Socrates can not doubt the truth of, i.e. the oracle of Delphi brought to Socrates from an external source. In addition, he accepted this oracle as seriously as his own consciousness after prolonged philosophical activity that he was not a wise man, although the content of the oracle was contradictory to his consciousness of his own ignorance. For this reason, at first he could not understand what the oracle said. For he could believe that the oracle said the truth, but still not clarify what the oracle said. Here is room for him to reason, but reasoning or logic is also beyond his control, as it were, outside of him. By obeying such logic he came to recognize his own philosophical activity as a command of the god. This may have been the only interpretation possible for him and as far as it goes he could have conviction about his own other beliefs. We may say his conviction was maximized here. This conviction was stated as a kind of knowledge in 29b and 37b.


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